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Since automobiles became streamlined it has become cus-
tomary to apply that description to so many things that the
expression has little special meaning. However, in a very true
sense it is proper to speak of a streamlined procedure. Stream-
lining is not synonymous with mere modernity, nor does it
mean the attachment of new and fancy gadgets. In fact it means
the very opposite. It is the removal of all unnecessary attach-
ments so that the object can move through the surrounding
medium with the least possible friction.
Does the ordinary litigated case move through the courts
without any disturbance of the procedural mechanisms? Does
the case quickly reach a decision upon the merits without being
shunted off upon some procedural side issue? If that is true
there is no need of streamlining. If, however, cases are being
delayed because of procedural problems, or if the cases are
frequently disposed of on procedural grounds, then it is time
to give some attention to streamlining.
That there has been some prostitution of procedural devices
will hardly be challenged. The legal profession gives lip serv-
ice at least to the philosophy that the legal system is set up to
settle disputes between litigants or to make certain adjustments
between individuals. It will not be openly admitted that the
legal system is established merely for the sport of a privileged
group or to be exploited by that group for profit. However,
many lawyers justify certain present practices on the ground
that the legal system is a fixed institution and any litigant is
entitled to use it to his own advantage as he finds it.
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This attitude is shown by the boast many lawyers make of
the number of cases they are able to dispose of on procedural
grounds. Such result may be to the advantage of the adminis-
trative group but it certainly is opposed to the basic purposes of
the system and it gives the public just cause for criticism.
There is a natural hesitancy on the part of the legal pro-
fession to bring about any change in this legal system. This is
somewhat justified because for a time such change disturbs the
whole proceeding and riles up the quiet waters of procedure
which have become settled and reasonably dear. This hesi-
tancy, however, must not take the form of complete opposition,
otherwise there could be no improvement. If a change is desired
a temporary disturbance may be expected for the ultimate good
of the system.
In suggesting any change in the legal machinery it must be
recognized that the legal system is not made up entirely of
rules of practice. It is controlled very largely by the attitudes
of the lawyers and judges. While the rules may be modified
somewhat to permit a more free play of new attitudes, yet there
will be no significant change without some modification of exist-
ing attitudes. This accounted for the hostile reception which
the codes received almost a century ago. On the other hand
the Federal Rules received such general and public considera-
tion that the legal profession had become prepared for them
and a more favorable reception may be expected. Any similar
change in the state practice should therefore be preceded by
full discussion and explanation.
RISKS ENCOUNTERED BY USING THE OLD MACHINE
It has become almost a common-place to view with alarm
the future of the practice of law unless some change is made in
court procedure. The past record is a familiar story but the bar
has too often overlooked its significance.
A generation ago the legal profession was primarily occu-
pied in its litigation with master and servant problems. These
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were being disposed of with the traditional techniques of court
procedure. The public was dissatisfied with this method of
handling these very important problems, and workmen com-
pensation laws were adopted taking the bulk of those cases out
of the courts. At the same time the business man was not satis-
fied with the way the courts handled his litigation and he
turned to arbitration proceedings. Then there arose a multitude
of disputes in the expansion of administrative activities of gov-
ernment. These disputes have largely been kept out of the
courts because of the courts' inability to handle those matters
expeditiously.
Recently suggestions have been made to take the present
automobile litigation out of the courts and to create adminis-
trative boards to handle all automobile accidents upon some
system of compensation. If this occurs there would be very
little left of court litigation.
This trend away from the courts has been due to two fac-
tors. One is the hesitancy of the courts to deal with matters
other than actual trials and the other is the retention of prac-
tices in court trials which are out of place in the present day.
Courts may be effective administrative agencies to supervise
the settlement of legal disputes between parties and do not need
to limit their activities to the trial of law suits. This is the role
courts are playing in the criminal field. The reports of criminal
cases in Ohio show that for the past several years only about
16 per cent of the defendants indicted in the common pleas
courts are disposed of by trial, either court or jury.' This is
about the percentage in other states.2
If the court has become a great administrative agency in the
criminal field it should all the more be so in the civil field
1 See Judicial Crimioal Statistics, 1937, U. S. Dept. of Commerce. Pre-
pared by Ronald H. Beattie. For Ohio the total defendants indicted were
6,oio, of these 99z (or I6.5%) were disposed of by trial to court or jury.
2 Ibid. For the states reporting criminal statistics (twenty-nine), except
Pennsylvania, there were io,ioo tried out of 61,o45 or 6.5%. Pennsylvania
is excluded because the record of that state is unusual as 43.6% of criminal
cases were disposed of by trial.
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where there is greater room for adjustment and compromise.
If the courts more actively assist in solving the controversy
apart from a trial, courts will win back a large number of dis-
putes now avoiding those courts.
The other failure of the present day court is the retention
of a large amount of trial tactics and procedures which are now
outworn. There has been considerable discussion of the "sport-
ing theory of justice." But there is more to the problem than
a neat phrase. A lawsuit is an application to the sovereign power
of a commonwealth to lend its offices in settling a dispute
between parties or otherwise establishing their legal relations
and in making effective such determination. A lawsuit is not
a mere "battle of wits," a forensic game to be played for the
amusement of the contending lawyers. It is not a device
whereby a clever lawyer can exploit the situation for his own
or his client's advantage. Contentious it is and contentious it
must be to reach a reasonably satisfactory solution of the prob-
lem. But the contention must be carried on to the end that the
original dispute may be settled upon its merits. The responsi-
bility of seeing that this is accomplished rests primarily with
the judges. Lawyers in their zeal for a client's cause may be
expected to push their cause to a conclusion favorable to their
client within the limits of the procedural mechanisms.
Fifty years ago litigation may very well have been different.
Court dockets were not crowded, court administration was not
expensive, and community life was not complex. It could very
well happen that at such period the court house was the amuse-
ment center of the community. The parties and the public were
all prepared for a good show and the drama of the trial over-
shadowed notions of substantial justice.
In the little litigation that is left in the courts much of this
drama of the earlier days has been retained. This dramatic side
show, this forensic by-play has so bogged down the trial of
cases that litigation has reached its present state.
The legal profession is becoming aroused to the perilous
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situation confronting the courts and the profession has therefore
taken a new interest in this whole problem of procedural change.
The American Bar Association at the Cleveland meeting in
1938 gave much attention to this problem. The reports of com-
mittees there adopted have started a new trend toward a read-
justment of this whole problem of court administration.3
BASIC PLAN OF THE NEw PROCEDURE
One significant development has been the formation and
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the Dis-
trict Courts of the United States. These rules, while establish-
ing a new and uniform procedure in the Federal Courts, do
much more in serving as a guide for all future procedural
changes.
The Judicial Council in Ohio has been studying these rules
for the past two years and has recommended the adoption of
many of them for Ohio. Such recommendation has the endorse-
ment of the Ohio State Bar Association. However, the bar gen-
erally will not fully accept these changes unless there is a proper
understanding of the philosophy underlying these rules and the
procedure there set up.
The reports and writings of the members of the Advisory
Committee furnish the best evidence of the philosophy under-
lying these new rules.' However, it may not be amiss to ex-
amine that philosophy as applied to Ohio practice and in the
light of the attitude of Ohio lawyers toward change as brought
out in the various discussions within recent months.
There are four important features of these Federal Rules
which have been somewhat criticized and not fully understood
by Ohio lawyers.
See Reports of Americans Bar Association, 1938, Vol. 63, pp. 522-656.
4 Clark, The New Federal Rules-Underlying Philosophy Embodied in
Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 American Bar Assoc.
Journal 976 (1937); Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 Wash. U.L.Q.
297 (1938) ; Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W.Va. L.Q. 5 (1938).
See also Proceedings of the Cleveland Institute on Federal Rules (1938), and
the Proceedings of the Institute at Washington and Symposium at New York
City (1939).
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I. Pleadings are not for the purpose of disclosing evidence.
2. The issue-forming stage is to be distinguished from the trial stage.
3. Effective court administration requires greater judicial discretion.
4. Trial economy can be realized only through a judicial pre-survey
of the issues.
I. Pleadings Do Not Disclose Evidence
The original codes provided that the plaintiff should state
the facts of the case. This seemed harmless enough but a tre-
mendous amount of law developed under the theory that the
defendant is entitled to information about the claim and that the
statements must be facts, not conclusions.
One basic assumption of the Federal Rules is that the plead-
ings are not to serve the purpose of furnishing evidence. There
has been an ever increasing practice in some quarters to use the
pleading device to get more and more information about the
opponent's case. The defendant files a motion for more specific
statement in the hope that the plaintiff will commit himself to
a specific proposition which he will be unable to sustain, or, as
is said, "get the wrong sow by the ear." The defendant is not
really seeking information about plaintiff's case as his pockets
are usually bulging with reports, photographs, and written
statements.
If additional information is really sought, the law provides
facilities for getting it by extra-pleading devices such as inter-
rogatories to the parties or other discovery practices. The
pleading device is not suited for this purpose because in the
hands of the experienced pleader the request for more specific
information is often answered by giving so much detail that in
the end there is no certain information as to the exact nature
of the claim.
This sparring for an advantage at the pleading stage gets
the parties only further away from the real issue. The plead-
ing is supposed to give notice of the issue and its purpose has
been well described by Judge Charles E. Clark as follows:
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What we can expect, however, is such a statement of the case as will
isolate it from all others, so that the parties and the court will know what
is the matter in dispute, the case can be routed through the court processes
to the proper method of trial and disposition, and the judgment will be
res adjudicata, so that the matter cannot again be litigated.'
This effort to secure facts, that is information rather than
claims, has led to a large amount of litigation attempting to
distinguish between the statement of a fact and a conclusion.
The Federal Rules avoid this confusion by only requiring a
"statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to
relief." It is conceded that the statement may be in the form
of a conclusion. But why not? There is no logical distinction
between the statement of a fact and a conclusion. This has been
demonstrated by many legal scholars from Professor W. W.
Cook to more recent authorities.6 All statements involve more
or less a process of abstraction and inference. The difference lies
more in the degree of the conclusion.
Courts have been put to considerable strain to find a rational
basis of determining the method of describing a negligence case.
The more honest courts have ceased to decide merely by logic
and have admitted that precedent and analogy are the only
guides.7
A few samples of pleadings that commonly arise will suffice.
In a case in the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County,
which is typical of many like it, the petition alleged that the
"collision knocked the plaintiff violently against the left side of
defendant's car throwing said plaintiff against the arm rest with
an unusual degree of force." The words "with an unusual
degree of force" were stricken as purely a conclusion. How-
ever, the word "violently" did not seem to bother the defend-
' Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, supra, p. 3 16.
' Cook, Statements of Facts in Pleading under the Codes, zi Col. L. Rev.
416 (1921); Facts and Statements of Facts, 4 Chicago L. Rev. 233 (937);
Clark, Code Pleading, i5o (1928).
7 Clark v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 28 Minn. 69, 9 N.W. 75 (188I).8 Latham v. Co-op Cabs Inc., No. 14327 z , Franklin County Common
Pleas Court (unreported).
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ant. Further on the plaintiff alleged that she "suffered con-
siderable pain since the accident." The word "considerable"
was stricken as a conclusion. Several specifications of negligence
were stricken because they were conclusions, one of which was
"That defendant's agent failed to have the said taxi-cab under
proper control."
In 1938 the Franklin County Common Pleas Court con-
sidered about 12oo motions and demurrers. Many of these no
doubt served a beneficent purpose of making the issues more
distinct, but it is also true that a great many had little such
effect. Probably they did little except delay answer day a few
weeks or months or possibly serve to confuse the opponent.
In the Columbus Municipal Court a similar record can be
found. Here is a sample.' A motion was sustained to strike as
a conclusion the following allegation about an automobile
driven "into the path of said plaintiff's automobile in such a
manner as to make it impossible for said plaintiff so operating
his automobile to avoid striking the automobile operated by the
defendant."
It is conceded that in the interest of substantial justice the
issues must be reasonably well defined before trial, but it is
submitted that the present pleading practices do not accomplish
that result and other agencies must be resorted to. In Ohio if
the allegation is very brief a motion is made for more specific
statement. If the statement is very complete a motion is made
to strike portions of it as conclusions.
A decided contrast is a recent case under the Federal Rules.
The plaintiff sued for personal injuries received in the explosion
of a dynamite cap and alleged that "said explosion and the
injuries to the plaintiff resulting therefrom were caused solely
by the carelessness and negligence of the defendant in manu-
facturing and distributing a dynamite cap." The trial court
sustained a motion for more definite statement."0 The Court of
9Jones v. Duvall, No. 242,289, Columbus Municipal Court (unre-
ported).
o Sierocinski v. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 25 Fed. Supp. 706 (1938).
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Appeals reversed the case on the ground that the plaintiff need
not plead evidence and that he has pleaded the ultimate fact.11
This ultimate goal of pleading is probably disturbing to
many lawyers who have become accustomed to the meticulous
care with which they quibble over trivialities. This change has
not yet been recommended for Ohio. However, the procedure
cannot operate with directness and common sense until some
such change is adopted.
2. Issue-forming Process Distinguished from Trial
The second fundamental philosophy behind the new Fed-
eral Rules is the separation of the pleading stage from the trial
stage. This differs from the usual code idea where rules of
joinder of issues were arbitrarily made because of some pre-
conceived notion of trial convenience. However, those joinder
rules have been found arbitrary and in many cases there was
little relationship to trial convenience or an economical dispo-
sition of issues.
One hundred persons may have invested in a fraudulent
stock scheme based upon the misrepresentations in a prospectus.
The only real issues are the questions whether the representa-
tions were false and known to be false. These questions are
identical and one trial can settle all these cases. The orthodox
joinder rule will prevent this single trial because each claimant
presents a distinct legal issue. Actually there are only these
common issues. The Federal Rules adopt the realistic view and
permit a very free joinder of claims at the pleading stage, and
if trial convenience is not actually served the trial court can
reshuffle the issues for purpose of trial.
There is no thought that all issues should be tried at one
time and that one big lawsuit can be used to settle all the liti-
gation for the term. The new plan contemplates a united trial
whenever the separate issues can be conveniently tried together
and joinder will not depend upon arbitrary and unreal legal-
istic distinctions.
1 Ibid., 103 Fed. (2d) - (April 24, 1939).
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The argument is made that this new procedure will result
in a battle royal. Such argument misses the point. A battle
royal will seldom be allowed and when allowed it will be
because that is the most convenient way of settling the
difficulties.
These free joinder rules have been the subject of consider-
able discussion on the part of Ohio lawyers. The first reaction
usually is that such rules would result in untold confusion.
Usually situations are thought of to show the extremes to which
this joinder procedure would permit unrelated claims to be
joined. Such reasoning overlooks the hypothesis that if the
issues cannot be conveniently tried together they need not be.
Also such argument overlooks the natural interest of a plaintiff
not to make the issues so complex that he will not get anything.
The experience in other states where similar rules have been
in force for many years shows that these fears will not be
realized.
In Ohio at the present time there can be as extreme joinder
of claims as is feared will happen under the new practice. Yet
these joinders do not occur as no plaintiff is foolish enough to
mess up his case with such confusion. All codes permit unlim-
ited joinder of ex contractu claims. It is therefore possible to
join:
i. Action on promissory note
2. Money due on purchase of car
3. Damages for breach of promise to marry
4. Return of money paid for land induced by fraud
5. Damages upon conversion of property where plaintiff waives the
tort and sues upon the implied contract
It is not argued that the present joinder rules should be changed
because of the possible abuse of the privilege.
Many lawyers who are disturbed at the liberal provisions
of the Federal Rules admit that the present rules should be
changed to permit certain joinder now denied, but they favor
language which is not so frightening.
Instead of permitting joinder of defendants where common
questions of law or fact will arise there has been assent to the
proposal that defendants may be joined when they are alter-
natively or concurrently liable. This provision would remove
the present confusion in Ohio law on the question of joint tort-
feasors. There seems to be no objection to joining in the single
suit defendants who could be sued separately.
In like manner many lawyers who do not like unlimited
joinder of plaintiffs do not object to the joinder of a personal
injury action of a minor with the father's action for loss of
services. This matter may be handled by expanding the pro-
vision for consolidation so that actions may be consolidated upon
the application of either party if common questions of law or
fact exist in the controversies. This will permit the court to
consider directly the matter of trial convenience based upon the
issues in the particular case. The present law does not permit
consolidation unless the causes could originally have been
joined, which does not distinguish between the pleading stage
and the trial stage.
The Ohio judicial machine cannot serve adequately the
present needs unless some change is made in joinder practices.
Joinder rules purport to avoid multiplicity of suits. Trial con-
venience, however, is served when the grouping is based on
similarities on a factual basis and not on the basis of legal theory.
Free joinder can be permitted upon a factual basis at the pre-
liminary trial stage with the court giving final consideration at
the trial stage when the real issues have developed. Thus
multiple suits will be avoided in the interest of the public and
the litigants.
3. Greater Judicial Discretion
The third general principle underlying the Federal Rules
is closely related to the foregoing. It recognizes the need of
extending judicial discretion in all matters of court admin-
istration.
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Many years ago Dean Pound pointed out that in the early
history of the law a rigid procedure was necessary to give ade-
quate protection to litigants as there was no substantive law to
guide the courts.12 Then through the evolution of the law there
developed a body of principles which has been called the sub-
stantive law which furnished this protection. When the law
has reached a stage of maturity the procedural requirements
may become less and less rigid. There need be only certain
basic procedural requirements, together with enough rigidity
to get the business taken care of in an orderly manner.
For the past century there has been a persistent demand to
free the administration of law from the over-emphasis upon
procedure. The first significant change came in England with
the Hilary Rules of 1834 where the technicalities of procedure
were sought to be avoided by the multiplicity of specific rules.
However, a reverse effect followed when some years later it
was reported that fifty per cent of the cases were disposed of
on procedural grounds. This same philosophy was behind the
code changes in this country beginning in 1 848, and the rigidity
of the forms of action was supplanted by definite rules.
The English were obliged to adopt a different philosophy
and in the Judicature Acts of the Seventies a system was set up
giving the maximum of discretion to the trial court. This has
been the tendency in recent state revisions and has its fullest
realization in the Federal Rules.
The opposition to judicial discretion is based upon a lack of
confidence in the courts. The original codes were being adopted
about the time that the popular election of judges came into
vogue. But if the quality of judges is the objection it can surely
not improve their character to tie them down to narrow ques-
tions and make them mere umpires calling balls and strikes.
The judges already have tremendous authority in the con-
trol of litigation and it can do no harm to admit openly their
responsibility. The courts cannot be expected to regain the con-
12 Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 Ill. L. Rev. 388
(1g9o).
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fidence of the public until the administration of justice is
constantly kept in mind as the primary object of the courts and
that the courts cease being arenas merely for the contests of
opposing champions.
4. Judicial Survey of Issues
The fourth important element of the new procedure is the
extension of the practice of a preliminary survey of the issues
by the court. Any realistic appraisal of the judicial system will
conclusively demonstrate that the present pleading practices do
not notify the parties and the court of the precise questions that
will be tried in the case. Because the real issues have not been
made definite the parties often are required to present evidence
of many preliminary matters which are not really controverted.
An issue has been raised on paper many times because the op-
ponent has a faint hope that the matters will be difficult to
prove and the case may be won on a fluke. This shadow-boxing
with collateral issues only prolongs the trial and increases the
expense.
Various devices have been suggested and adopted to smoke
out the real issue and to eliminate the sham issue. Some courts
developed the practice of calling the attorneys for a conference
upon the commencement of the trial, other courts have required
confidential briefs from the parties in advance of trial so that
the court might be informed of the real controversy.
A more specific remedy adopted in England many years
ago and introduced in many jurisdictions in this country is the
summary judgment procedure. By this procedure a party chal-
lenges his opponent to show cause why there should be a trial
and if no real issue is apparent the court immediately disposes
of the case. This is an effective device to prevent uncalled-for
delays in the final disposition of the case where there is no
merit in the claim or defense. Even in those cases where the
judgment is not immediately entered the procedure is effective
in narrowing the trial to the real issue.
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Recently another device has been developed called pre-trial
procedure which incorporates some of the features of former
practices. This is a conference upon the case where the parties
and the court go over all the issues to determine the exact mat-
ters in dispute and thus narrow the cause to its real limits, and
all unnecessary by-play and stage trappings are eliminated. The
case can thus be disposed of with greater dispatch and with a
great deal more assurance of settling the merits of the
controversy.
WILL OHIO PROCEDURE BE STREAMLINED?
These Federal Rules have been discussed in Ohio for a
number of months, but the bar generally is indifferent to them,
largely because the purposes are not fully understood. If the
bar desires to help the courts regain the prestige which has been
lost somewhat in recent years, then it must aid in improving the
judicial machinery so that the case may move expeditiously
through the courts to a final determination of the original
controversy.
This modern machine is not a fantastic vision of impractical
dreamers; it is now becoming a reality in the Federal Courts.
The new procedure depends somewhat upon a change of rules
but to a greater extent it depends upon the attitudes of those
administering it. One cannot change human institutions without
a corresponding change in human nature. An enlightened self
interest on the part of the bar is envisioning a new procedure,
and as this understanding spreads, new attitudes will be formed
which will make the new procedure effective. The legal system
so envisaged and built upon the philosophies herein set forth
will be able to take its place among the many other new insti-
tutions in the "world of tomorrow."
